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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\\.r ALKER BANK AND TRt~ST CQjy[-
P ANY) a corporation) 
Plaiut iff iiJid ReJ pond m!. j 
vs. 
I, Case 1:'\ O~ 
9098 
I 
NEW YORK TERlvfiNAL WAREHOUSE ) 
COMPA r\'~{~ a corporation, 
Defendant and Appeilanl. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Hon_ fv[errill C. 
Faux presiding, entered money judg1nent in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendanL The defendant has appealed 
from the judgment. 
The complaint:t follo~'iting a conversion theory, claimed 
that defendant~ Ne'v York Terminal Warehouse Company, 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without authority from the plaintiff bank, w rongf ull y delivered 
plaintiff's merchandise to a third person (R. 1·2). Defendant 
pleaded a \Varehousing agreement with plaintiff, ctaim.ing 
delivery in a ceo rd a nee ~T i th that agreement) estoppel of plain tiff 
to claim conversion, and payment (R. 15-17). The pre-trial 
order reframed the issues to show that the pJaintiff claimed 
jus tifi cation in deli v e I in g by virtue of an agreement betv.t een 
pJaintiff and de-fendant and another agreement between plaintiff 
and John R. Woods. The estoppel issue \Vas retained as to each 
delivery and all deliveries (R+ 18·22) ~ 
1' I i al \\-'as be£ ore the Hon. Mer ri 11 c+ .Faux' sitting without 
a jury. Plain tiff introduced a s ta tern en t of indebtedness of 
John R. Woods to it (R. 35, Exhr P-1); tw-elve warehouse 
receipts issued by defendant (R. 36, Exh. P-2); five delivery 
order5 shov.ring delivery of merchandise to John R+ Woods~ 
together \V 1 th five checks dra 'vn on plain tiff and signed by 
\Xi oods ( Rr 36, Exhr P- 3) ; a summary of va] ues of !terns 
claimed to have been converted (R. 3 7, Exh. P -4) , and instruc · 
tion s to defend ant? s storekeeper ( R~ 3 7) Exh. P-7) . 
Having ii1 trod uc ed the above ex hi bits, plaintiff rested and 
objected to the introduction of evidence by defendant (R. -12). 
Defendant thereupon moved for judgment of nonsuit of the 
ground that the plaintiff had not made a prima fade case ( R. 
42, 47, 49). 1''he Court overruled both motions (RT 49 and 
6 5) , and defendant proceeded with its proof. 
Defendant produced not only the material documentary 
evidence relating to receipts and deliveries of merchandise, but 
called as its witnesses (or introd~ed deposition testimony of) 
all the individuals most directly connected ·with the trans-
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actions at the times they occurred: C. ]. Holt, defendant's 
vice-president in charge of West Coast sales an~ operations 
(R. 65-66); H. A. Robbins, who was, during the course of 
the transactions, manager and vice-president of plaintiff's 
Murray branch, with general authority to bind the plalnbiT 
in contract .and to make loans (R+ 21~ 108), and who handled 
the transactions for p 1 aintiff; John R. Woods, .an appliance 
jobber indebted to the plain tiff., and V/ ith ref e renee to whose 
business the warehouse receipts had been issued in the first 
pla(e (R. 188); and Harvey R. Moorehead, a former employee 
of defendant) Vtrho had been storekeeper in the defendant's 
warehouse during much of the time material to the action 
(R+ 143). 
These four were the dr amati s personae+ Their testimony~ 
as the fallowing resume shows, contained substantially similar 
stories of the series of transactions involving plain tiff, defend· 
ant, and John R. Woods~ 
Testimony of C. f Holt. In the spring of 1956 Holt met 
with H. A. Robbins and John R. Woods in plaintiff's Murray 
Bran~ bank) Woods having asked Holt to discuss with Rob-
bins the po ssi blli ty of issuing ware house receipts to the bank 
against stored mer chan dlse as a credit arrangement for Woods 
(R. 66). It \vas agreed that warehouse receipts might be issued 
to the bank and that the bank and 'W'oods would arrange the 
method of handling the loan~ but no definitive agreement was 
reached at that time ( R. 67) . Holt heard not bing more concern· 
ing the transaction until the storekeeper at the Salt Lake ware~ 
house sent papen; to clef end ant's Los Angeles office with a 
request that warehouse receipts be issued to the bank. Receipts 
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Vle re is sued ( R. 6 7) . Again silence. Nothing £ urther \vas 
heard from the bank until deliveries had been made to Woods 
and a delivery order (authorizing such delivery) had come in 
signed by the bank (R. 67). Ex(ept for periodic receipt of 
such signed delivery orders~ dcfendanfs next communication 
from the bank \vas a letter dated October 16, 1956 (R~ 68), 
The letter, Exhibit D-5, 1s reprinted in Appendix A. Holt 
\Vrote a reply Jetter to plaintiff stating that he took the October 
16th letter to mean that th c war ehouse•nan was authorized 
to deliver the ~oods upon receipt of a check from Woods. 
This letter~ to gcth er ~T i th a suggested \\" areho use agreement be-
t~-ecn p! ai n tiff and de£ en dan t, is r epr in ted as A pp en dixes B and 
C. Defendant received no reply to its letter, and attempts by Holt 
to con tact Rob bins personally proved unsuccessful (R. 6 8-69) _ 
Defendant maintains a recon.l sys tern as a •nean 5 of keep· 
ing constant control over stored merchandise~ Upon receipt 
of goods in the ~· areho use a receiving report is sent to de fend-
ant's los Angeles office by the local storekeeper. From that 
report Los Angeles prepares warehouse receipts and forwards 
them to the warehouse receipt holder (plain tiff) , sending 011 c 
copy to the store keeper, retaining another copy l and forwarding 
one to the l'iew York office for processing on IBM cards. 
Each day the 1 ocal storekeeper sends in a report showing 
whether or not he received or delivered me rc:han d i se during 
the course of the particular day. As deliveries are made, the 
storekeeper prepares d eJ j very orders for merchandise that has 
been shipped and posts his copy of the delivery order to his 
copy of the \~· a.reho use receipt. He sends co pies of the de livery 
order to Los Angeles on the day of its issue. There the delivery 
order is recorded and for~varded to the IBM department for 
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processtng. The storekeeper .. s records include a copy of the 
receiving report) the warehouse receipt under which it is 
stored, and the delivery order. The warehouse receipt copy is 
kept posted to reflect the amount of rna te rial remaining in the 
\\'arehouse under that receipt (R. 70). 
Los Angeles keeps a running acc:ouot of merchandise in 
each of its .field warehouses. One of the records is a. control 
sheet on which the in£ or rna tion on the dai 1 y reports is recorded 
as they are received from the storekeeper-one daily report 
being received for each day 7 The information from the daily 
report is also recorded on the copy of the delivery order 
received from the storekeeper. The information is passed on 
to the 1 B M department for processing. Receipt of the white 
copy of the delivery order at the Los Angeles office gives the 
employees there notice that the original of the deli very order 
is somewhere along the route of storekeeper to receipt holder 
to Los Angeles office~ 
A file of the daily reports is maintained together with 
warehouse receipt copies and delivery order originals. In add i · 
tion to the white copy of the del (very order, sent to it directly 
by the storekeeper~ Los Angeles receives the original signed 
delivery order from the bank. The originals usually come in 
by mail; upon being received they are opened and tiine-stamped; 
they thus show the exact date and time of receipt in the Los 
Angeles office ( R~ 71-72) . 
If~ in checking its recordsJ Los Angeles found it necessary 
to make corrections in an original delivery order, the bank 
would be notified of. the error, which usually ~· o uld be Vtt' ith 
reference to a lot number or a model number or a serial number 
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or nsome such minor correctionn ( R+ 72) + From the various 
reports received from the stoJekeeper and the bank _the Los 
Angeles office would prepare a ··stock and value report~'· 
\·..-hich is an IR;\-f tabulated report of the activity of the .invenr 
tory ( R. 77) . It was defendant's practice~ at the time of audits 
of the \v areho use, to bring the IBM report up to date from 
the records of the storekeeper~ physically check the inventory 
and, upon return of the auditors to the Los Angeles office~ 
to vcr i fy that d cl ivcry ord c rs had been received from the ware-
house receipt ho J d er s cl caring all in vcn tory that had been 
delivered since the last IBM report Once a month a copy of 
the ··stock and value·' report was forwarded to plaintiff and 
another copy to the storekeeper. There was an ... automatic'' 
check to see that the \-Varehouse company had delivery orders 
to cover all goods theretofore delivered~ At the time of auditing 
th c Vi.-T arch ous c ~ m c rchandis e shown by the report to be in the 
~varehouse ~vas physically inventoried (R. 78) ~ If goods ·were 
miss 1ng from the \van~~ouse defendant would request a deli very 
order from tp.e bank (R. 79). 
Defendant interpreted the plaintiffs October 16th letter 
as meaning defendant should deliver merchandise on receipt 
of a ch cck ( R. 8 2) and construed plaintiffs failure to answer 
defendanfs November 12th letter as an acceptance of this 
construction (R. 84) . The purpose of the enclosure ·with 
defendant's letter (Appendix C) was to permit the bank to 
place additional restrictions upon the delivery of materials so 
that it might protect itself further (R~ 88). 
On or about May 6~ 1957~ T. B. Akeley, an auditor in 
defendant's Los Angeles office't sent a communication to the 
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Salt Lake storekeeper telling him that ·~until further notice 
from me or from my Los Angeles office no further goods 
may be delivered or removed from our leased warehouse area.n 
On about May 10. 1957j Holt went to Salt Lake City to close 
out the warehouse. At that time he prepared a delivery o rdcr 
for the five or six units remaining in the \varehouse, obtained 
a check from \X'oods, and personally mailed check and delivery 
order to the bank. 
In his capacity as vice~president of New v-or~ Termjnal 
Warehouse Company Holt made inspections of the field ware-
house in Salt Lake City (R. 2 2 3) . He made ins pee tions in 
July of 1956 and in December of 1956 at which time he checked 
the physical inventory at the wa. rehouse against the IBM records 
at the office (R. 223). In December of 1956 the inventory 
agreed with the company records (R. 223). 
Testimony of H. A. Robbins .. Robbins did most of plain-
tiff· s work with W~ oods (R. 211 ) . He recalled setting up a loan 
arrangement for Woods (R. 110) and would possibly have 
discussed it with Woods (R. 111) 7 He recalled that the mer-
chandise would be paid for by checks, that John R. Woods' 
checks \Vere acceptable as payments~ and that it ~VaS not his 
understanding that Woods would have to come to the bank 
first before v .. dthdrawing material from the warehouse (R. 111~ 
118, 120) + 
During the operation of the warehousing agreement he 
received delivery orders from the storekeeper (R. 113) or 
from Woods (R. 113). He \vould sign one and send it to Los 
Angeles ( R7 1 14) ~ but he would hold the delivery orders un t lJ 
the Woods' check was paid (R. 114) 125). Frequently he would 
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ho 1 d a check until deposits had been made into the account by 
Woods (R. 115). He knew that Woods was a umerchandise 
jobber" and that such jobbers ordinarily sell to retailers {R. 
115)+ 
When Robbins sent the letter to defendant on October 
16~ l956j it Vilas not his intention to make any change in the 
\\'a y vla rehousing \Yas being handled ( R~ 11 7) + 
Rob bins saw \X' 0() ds f r equen tJ y-a bout ., twice a week, 
( R. 119). Three or four tilnes between April of 1956 ( v-.Then 
the .first delivery orders \vere issued) and May of 1957 (v.then 
the warehouse was cJ os ed) , agents 01 employees of the bank 
n1ade inspections of the \\o"'arehouse ~·in a general Vt~"ay'' (R~ 1.21). 
The inspectors ~To uld ex amine the quarters to sec whether 
the merchandise \Vas properly set asid~ and taken care of; 
they would compare serial numbers on the delivery orders 
(R. 121). It was their duty to report shortages to the bank 
(R. 121). Robbins testified a second time that bank inspectors 
~-·ere sent to I ook at the goods ( R. 21 7) ~ Plain tiff bank never 
to J d t h c v.ra rehouse company that conditions were u ns a tis factory 
(R. 217). There must have been a report to the bank (R. 219). 
On one or two occasions there v.rere a cou pie of units ~·that 
might not have be en there,'' and this was mentioned to Robbins 
by a field man (R. 20 0) ~ When shortages ~vere found plain tiff 
called them to the attention of Woods~ not defendant) \vhere-
upon Woods would give delivery orders (R. 220~ 221). 
Delivery orders received by the bank .showed on their 
face that the merchandise ha.d been received by Woods (R. 
122). "l'he bank would sign them later (R. 122) although 
they were already signed by Woods (R. 122) . The last five 
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delivery orders, for which the action was brought, were found 
by Robbins on his desk (R .. 123). It was usual for him to find 
dellvery orders on his desk (R. 123). Prior to closing of the 
warehouse Woods had mentioned to Robbins that it would 
be closed (R. 124) and had made arrangements for .a cashier's 
check with which to pay storage charges ( R_ 1.24). 
During the time in which \X1oods w·as using the warehouse 
receipt arrangement he was overdraft with the bank part of 
the time, and at other times the bank paid checks from his 
account even though there v..-'as no mo~ey in it (R. 127~ l2H). 
He knew that in purchasing goods from wholesalers some 
retail dealers nftooredt) their units (R. 128). It was not Ivlr. 
Robbins' understanding that the bank would take any steps 
in connection ~rith the delivery orders before merchandise was 
removed from the warehouse ( R. 212) . When a de li'Yery order 
was received with a check from John R. Woods~ it .;vas assumed 
that the goods had been delivered by the time the bank got the 
deli very order . ( R. 213) , or would be without the bank doing 
anything, further (R. 213~ 214) . The trial judge stated that 
this is what he would take Mr. Robbins~ testimony to mean 
(R. 216). 
·restimon)' of fohn R. Woods. John R~ Woods ran a dis-
tributing business in Salt Lak c City during 'Nhich time he had 
dealings with Walker Bank, particularly ~rith Robbins~ for 
four or five years (R. 189-190). With reference to merchandise 
in defendant's warehouse~ it \vas Woodst agreement with the 
bank that he could take the merchandise out and then pay 
Walker for it (R. 190) . Robbins agreed to hold the checks 
for bjm ( R_ 190), and checks given for the merchandise didn't 
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have to be made good immediately~ This was okay with Robw 
bins (R. 191). It was the practice of Woods to go to the bank 
sometimes t\vo or three times per week (R. 191). The bank 
would hold checks until Woods \vas able to cover them (R. 
19~2wl99). Most of the time there was not enough 1n the 
account to cover the checks (R~ 199). It v~-as his practice to 
have the bonded warehouseman ( s torekeepcr) make the checks 
out, then the de ti very orders and checks would be given to 
Robbins (R. 193). \:\Then defendant's agents came to Salt Lake 
City ~tcvcry thirty Jays or so'' the accounts had to balance 
(R. 201); and they usually did balance (R. 201). Signed 
checks w·ere left in the office (R. 207) and were to be filled 
in, sometirn es, but not neces sar il y ~ by the bonded agent ( R. 
206). The last group of delivery orders may have been delivered 
in part by Woods and part by mail (R. 2o6) ~ 
Testimony of Harvey R. JHoorehead. Moorehead v.r·as 
defenJanfs storekeeper at the SaJt Lake City warehouse, 
charged 'With the duty of 1naintaining the warehouse and re-
ceiving payment for the goods (R. 141). He was also employed 
by \X'oods (R. 143) 144). At all times during his tenure as a 
storekeeper he had in his possession blank checks signed by 
Woods (R _ 144) . It was \XI oods' practice to remove goods 
from the warehouse, Moorebead making notes of the numbers 
to accumulate a sufficient number to be included in a single 
order (R. 146) . The delivery orders sometimes 'vould be taken 
by Woods to the bank person.all y and sometimes sent. The 
copy of each delivery order was sent to Los Angeles on the 
day jc v.,.·as made out (R. 145~ 146). 
Inventories of the merchandise 1n the warehouse ~vere 
10 
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made from time to time by both plaintiff and defendant (R. 
146) I If defendant's agents discovered shortages they would 
clear them up and obtain a check (R. 146) ~ but when shortages 
\vere discovered by the bankt the bank representative pwould 
go directly to Mr. Woods,'' then Moorehead would do what 
Woods told him (R. 147). Woods made arrangements with 
plaintifFs vice-president~ RobbinsJ to pay for the merchandise 
(R. 147). 
The signed check maintained in the po5session of Mr. 
Moorehead at all times v..~as not actually filled in with an 
amount or payee or date until a delivery order ~·as made up 
(R. 149). 
Woods did some flooring with Refrigeration Distributors 
Corporation ( R. 154) I During Moorehead's tenure as store-
keeper merchandise did not leave· the warehouse without his 
knowledge nor were others permitted to enter unless he ac · 
companied them (R. 182); and at all times he had a blank 
check signed by Woods (R. 183 ). Woods toJd Moorehead that 
the bankt through ·Robbinst would give Woods a personal 
loan to pay for any goods removed from the '"'a rehouse ( R. 
185). Moorehead took orders at times from both Woods and 
defendant (R. l86w187). 
Counsel for plaintiff cross-examined Moorehead at length 
concerning testimony given at a hearing in connection with 
Woods~ bankruptcy (R. 153 et seq.). At the prior hearing 
Moorehead testified that. the Hshipment date" shown on in· 
voices would probably be the date upon which merchandise 
\vas shipped from the warehouse (R. 15 5 ) . Counsel did not 
ask the witness ~vhether he v.rould still so testify. Counsel 
11 
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pointed out that some invoices did not contain a date of 
shipment and as ked v.,T hethe r he had not testified at the previous 
h_earing that the ~~invoice daten would represent also the date 
of shipment ( R. 164) T The witness answered that if he had 
said that it Hvlouldn't be right" (R. 164). As to some Iner-
chand is e the ii 1 voices (Exhibits P ·15 through P ·19) sho~· ed 
on earlier "'shipn1en[ date'! than the date of delivery shown 
on the delivery orders (Exhibit P-3). 
On redirect 1-foorehead testified that the nshipment date" 
\vould mean the date 1nerchandise was Hshipped or transferred,'. 
and that it m1ght or might not have been delivered at that 
t i Jn e. '·Part of the 1nerchand is c ~Tou 1 d ha vc been de 1 ivered, 
possibly all of it, possibly none of if~ (RT 173) ~ When counsel 
asked the v.,· itness to ex plain and amplify his testimony at the 
prior bankruptcy proceedings the trial judge interposed. lie 
indicated that the 'vitness was probably a perjurer, adding that 
if th er c v.,ras a varia nee between the \Vi tness' testimony in this 
action and that in the- other proceeding a complaint would 
be issued (R. 175) T Nevertheless~ the trial judge would not 
permit counsel to offer evidence which wouJ d explain the 
apparent difference in the testimony and perforce rehabilitate 
the witness. Def en dan t offered to prove that the \ \~ i ti 1 e ss would 
testify that in response to a further question by Mr. Hoi brook 
at the bankruptcy proceeding, and as part of the same paragraph 
in \vhich he had been interrogated as to the meaning of the 
in voices~ he had stated, \~' ith re £ erence to a gues tion as to the 
cliff erence be tv.reen the dates on the invoices and the dates on 
the delivery orders that t tthe only explanation that I might 
give \vould be that they were not taken from the warehouse" 
on the earlier date; and that on more specific questioning 
12 
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Moorehead had testified that this must be so because the warer 
house people made periodic inspections and the goods would 
have had to have been in the warehouse. The Court rejected 
this offer on the ground that it was 4 !specul.ative" (R. 182). 
The Exhibits. T\venty-two exhibits were introduced~ some 
primarily formal) others containing substantial evidence of 
the course of dealings between the parties~ The documentary 
evidence as a \vhole corroborates the picture of the transaction 
as drav.rn by the four principal \Vttnesses. 
Exhibit P -1 supports the evidence that the warehouse 
receipts were being used as security for plain tiff· s extension 
of credit to Woods+ T~vo notes representing Woods' indebted-
ness were dated February 6~ 19 S 7. Exhibit P-2 consists of 12 
warehouse receipts upon which plain tiff based its action. Ex-
hibit P-3 consists of 5 delivery orders~ one having two pages~ 
accompanied by 5 checks, all of which contained signatures 
of John R. Woods in the appropriate places. It is the me rchan · 
dise listed on these delivery orders of which the plaintiff 
claims conversion. The values of the various items are set forth 
in Exhibit P -4, being in some instances less than the t t dec 1 a red 
value~' shown on the warehouse receipts. 
Exhibits D- 5 and D-6~ Vv·hich are printed at length in 
Appendixes A, B and C, comprise the only exchange of corres-
pondence between the plaintiff and the defendant relating to 
the warehousing arrangement. Exhibit D-5 shoVtrs that on 
October 16~ 1956, the vice-president of the pJ aintiff' s lv[urray 
branch wrote to defendant that it was the bank~s poJicy that 
the goods ,vould ''be paid for at the time they are withdra\vn.'' 
By Exhibit D-6 de£ endant informed plaintiff that it interpreted 
13 
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plaintiffs letter "to authorize delivery from the warehouse 
upon the receipt~ by our storekeeper~ of a check for John R. 
Woods Company,·· and suggested a long-form agreement under 
\Vhich plaintiff could place Jimits upon the quantity of mer-
chandise to be de livered in any one day, fix the pe rcen ta ge of 
declared doJla:r value of the merchandise to be delivered and} 
an1ong other things, place upon the warehouse company a 
contractu ral obligation to mail deb very orders and checks to 
the bank \Vi thin a stated period . 
.Exhibit P-7 is a standard form of instruction to .store-
keepers used by the defendant company, containing instructions 
to Moorehead. 
Exhibit P-8 consists of 25 delivery orders executed on 
various dates bernreen May 21l 1956~ and April 30, 1957. 
Fach of these delivery orders contains on its face plaintiffs 
written authorization for defendant to deliver J isted merchan-
dise to ''John R. Woods Company,'~ the name under which 
John R. Woods did business (R. 189). The back of each 
delivery order has been stamped to show the date of its receipt 
in los Angeles. This group of delivery orders is enlightening 
as to the methods of ope ration of d ef en dan t and plaintiff~ par-
ticularly when examined 1n l.lght of Rolfs testimony as to 
record~ keeping methods, Robbins' testimony as to plain tiff's 
actions \\·tih respect to delivery orders~ Exhibit D~22 (a copy 
of the ledger sheets relating to John R. Woods Company's 
account in the plain tiff bank) ~ and Exhibit D-21 (consisting 
of 9 checks dra'V't'n by Woods payable to plaintiff in amounts 
corresponding to merchandise declared values on various 
14 
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delivery orders). A swnmary of information contained trl 
these three exhibits is set out as Appendix D. 
Exhibits P-9 through P-13~ and D-14~ consist of corres-
pondence or memorandums exc.:ha nged behveen various off iters 
and employees of New York Terminal Warehouse Company+ 
They show a pattern of inspections, inventories and checks 
supporting the testimony of Hoi t~ Robbins~ \Voods and Moore~ 
head. Exhibits P-9 and D-14 should be considered together. 
Exhibit D·14 is an audit report relating to an inspect ion of 
the warehouse conducted on January 17) 195 7, by T. B. Akeley, 
identi£ed as an auditor for defendant; P~9 is an addendum 
to it.. The two exhibits show that M r ~ Akeley found some 
shortages and overages, that there was improvement since 
October 1 7, 1956 (approximate! y the time of the 1 etter from 
Robbjns to defendant) , that the conditions were corrected, 
and that Woods ot 4 runs the warehouse.n The last fact tends 
to cor1oborate Robbins~ statement (R. 220~ 221) tbat upon 
finding shortages plaintiff would notify John R~ Woods Com-
pany, not the warehouse.. Exhibit P-1 0, a report dated March 
27, 195 7) shows that all merchandise in the warehouse was 
accounted for as of that date but that some serial numbers 
were not in agreement. The report suggests that an adjustment 
record should be put through. Apparently this ~ras done~ 
Compare the delivery order dated April 3rd (part of Exhibit 
Q.g) ~ prepared for the purpose of correcting seriaJ numbers. 
Ex hi hit P- 1 1, a co nun unica tion dated February /j ~ 19 57, 
contains a comment on the report of January 17 ~ 19 57, and shows 
the company's concern with maintaining an efficient warer 
house. The writer of the communication suggests rna re~than-
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nonnal risks should be eliminated or the warehouse closed. 
It is no ted 1 n this report that the \Va rehouse had cons is ten t1 y 
checked out \vi th respect to inventory. Exhibit P -12 sh o~vs 
thas additional checks were being made by the defendant 
company as of .February 19) 1957~ and that the company was 
requiring the .storekeeper to send inventories and make addi-
tional reports on his actions. This exhibit also supports. Holt's 
testimony that there \vere no complaints from the bank, and 
s h ov.,ls that r el a tionshi ps behv een -plain tiff and Woods v,.r ere 
good. Bee au se of the close rela. tionshi p and the a ppar en t good 
stan ding of \Xl oods with the bank it v.ras determined) a ceo rding 
to this exhibit~ to close the operation out smoothly 'vithout 
requiring the bank to take d cl i very of tb e 1nerchandis e. I c is 
noted here, too, that the warehouse company did \~·hat "\\/as 
reasonable for it to do1 i.e~] watch the "flow of paper'' care-
fuJ Jy. As can be seen f ro1n Exhibits D-8 and D~ 22, summarized 
in Appendix D~ watching the flow of paper might prove to be 
unremunerative~ largely because of the plaintiff~s cooperation 
V/ i th \V./ oods in the processing of de livery orders. A ceo rding 
to Exhibit P-13 ~ on Ma. y 6, 19) 7 ~ defendant sent a communt-
cation to its storekeeper stopping deliveries from the ware· 
house. This is cons is tent with Half s testimony that on May 
10, 1957, he \.Vent to Salt Lake Gty to close out the warehouse~ 
made delivery orders for the five or six remaining items in the 
warehouse and gave the deli very order and check to plaintiff. 
Exhibits P · 1 5 and P -19 are copies of what purport to be 
invoices of John R. Woods Company. The significance of these 
invoices and their effect upon the course of the trial will be 
discussed in Point II of the argument. 
16 
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Exhibit D-23 consists of three checks drawn by John R~ 
Woods Company payable to plaintiff~ dated May 7, 8, and 
10, approximately the same time as the delivery orders of which 
the plaintiff complains. The significance of these checks was 
unknown to defendant and unexplained by plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The defendant's motion to dismiss the action~ made 
at the close of plain tiff~ s case, should have been gran ted. 
2. The Court erred in admitting evidence offered by the 
plaintiff and in excluding evidence offered by the defendant. 
3. In light of all the evidence, the Court's. findings of fact 
were clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law and judgment 
contrary to the evidence and against law. 
4+ The Court erred in denying the defend.anfs motion 
to strike plaintiff's cost bill and in allowing plaintiffs costs~ 
' 
5. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DEFENDANt'S ]'.lOTION TO DISMISS THE 
ACTION, MADE AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFFtS CASE, 
SHOULD HA VB BEEN GRANTED. 
The plaintiff put on no testimony in support of its case 
in chief. Its case consisted solely of facts established by the 
17 
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pre-trial order and Exhibits P-1~ P-2J P·3~ P-4 and P·7. As 
pointed out in the statement of facts these exhibits included 
a statement of indebtedness of Woods to plaintiff, t\velve wareA 
house receipts issued by the defendant sh O\Vi ng that m erchan-
disc had been received from Woods for account of plaintiff~ 
t~'; c deli very orders .sho"'~ing delivery of the merchandise to 
\"\T oods~ to get her -...vith five checks drawn by Woods to plain-
tiff's order) a list of values) and some instructions to de£ end an f s 
storekeepec It had been stipulated that the goods " .. ere delivered 
to a third person or persons by the defendant, thar the dellvery 
orders and checks came jnto possession of plaintiff) and that 
the checks had not been paid (R. 19). 
At this stage of the proceeding there was no evidence that 
plaintiff made a demand upon defendant £or redelivery of 
the goods (unless bringing an action for the value of the 
merchandise constitutes a demand) , or an offer to satisfy the 
warehouseman~ s lien. There was no ev ide nee that dc]iveqt 
had not been made to a person law£ ully en tit led to possession 
of the good5~ or his agent. In short, there was no evidence 
that defendant had wronged plaintiff. 
In putting on its case plaintiff apparently intended to take 
technical advantage of the provisions of 72·1-8 Ctah Code 
Annotated 1953., which provides: 
'·A v.ra reho u seman, in the absence of some la ~v ful 
excuse provided for by this title~ is bound to deliver 
the goods upon a demand rna de either by the holder of 
a receipt for the goods or by the depositor) if such de-
mand is accompanied v..rith: 
~ 1 ( 1) An offer to satisfy the warehouseman~ s J ien. 
* * * 
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"In case the warehouseman refuses or fails to deliver 
the goods in compliance ~7ith such a demand by the 
holder or depositor~ the burden shall be upon the ware~ 
houseman to establish the existence of a lawful excuse 
for such refusal." 
This se-ction of the Warehouse Receipts Act puts the 
burden of proof upon the warehouseman in some cases; but 
in order for a depositor or the holder of a. receipt to shift the 
burden he must show compliance with the provisions of the 
act~ i.e., he has to show demand and tender of the storage 
charges. It was so held in N ationaJ Dock and Storage Ware-
house Company ·r. United States, 27 F.2d 4 ( 1 Cir., 1928). 
In commenting upon the effect of the section~ the Circuit Court 
of Appeals said: 
''The District Court was of the optnton that the 
provision of Section 15, relating to a demand and offer 
to payJ was inserted for the benefit and protection of 
the warehouseman, and that~ unless he manifcs ted an 
intention at the time the demand was made that it be 
accompanied by an offer to pay, he should not be per-
mitted to avall himself thereafter of a failure to make 
the offer and escape the burden of proof 'vh ich the 
statute imposed upon him. But we do not think that 
the mere om iss ion of the warehouseman to request 
an offer of payment at the time the demand \vas made 
would ex~use the depositor from accompanring his 
demand with an offer of payn1ent. The requirement 
that the depositor so accompany his demand is a con-
dition to the imposition of the bur den of proof on 
the issue of negligence upon the "i;\'arehouseman, and, 
unless he has estopped himseJf by his conduct from 
insisting upon it, it must be complied with to cast 
the burden of proof upon him. n 
19 
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In the instant case~ there is not only no evidence of a 
tender of the storage charges~ but no evidence of a. demand 
at aiL The instant action can hardly be construed as a demand 
for return of the goods s 1nce the plain tiff bank, in the first 
instance, sued outright far conversion of the goods and at 
no time sought or taJked about their return. 
, In Dahl ~·. Winter-Truesdell Diercks Compan;·. 62 '1\. D. 
351~ 237 N. \Xr. 202 ( 1931.), the Supreme Court of North 
Dakota found a pleading bad because the pleader (the de-
positor) had failed to bring himself within the terms of the 
act as to burden of proof. Although the case is primarily 
c~nc ern ed -vv· i th a technical rule of pleading, the Court, s con-
struction of the act and its operation to shift the burden of 
proof is the same as that o£ the United States Court of Appeals 
in the ]\latinnal J)ock and Storage Warehouse case, supra. 
Discussing the section of the North Dakota act which is sub-
stantially the same as our 72-1-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
the Court said: 
~ ~ [fhis section J qualifies the obligation of the ware-
houseman to deliver upon demand by saying that he is 
bound to deliver ~if such demand is accompanied with: 
(a) an offer to satisfy the warehouseman~ s 1 ien) J and 
the fin a 1 paragraph of the section pJ aces the burden of 
establishing a J a ~rfuJ excuse for the refusal to comply 
with the demand upon the warehouseman only when 
the demand by the holder or depositor is t so accom-
panied.' Clearly~ we think the making of a proper 
demand is a condi tlon precedent to the obligation of 
the warehouseman to deliver. It is expressly made so by 
[the section J ~ above quoted.·' 
(The Utah act refers back to .. 'such a demand~ t inste.ad 
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of to "a demand so accompanied,t! but the meaning appears 
to be _identicaL) 
Plaintiff having failed to put on any evidence that the 
delivery was wrongfut or that John R. Woods Company "\vas 
not the person entitled to the goods or his agent., or that a 
demand had been made and refused, or that a tender of the 
storage charges had been made, the plaintiff did not establish 
a prim a fa c 1 e case either under the statute or general la 'v. Ac · 
cordingly~ the Court committed err?r in refusing the defend-
anfs motion for a nonsuit and placing the burden of proof 
on defendant. This error not only wronged the defendant 
then~ but changed the course of the triaL 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
OFFERED RY THE PLAINTIFF AND IN EXCLUDI~G 
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE DEFENDANT. 
During the course of the trial the Court committed preju-
dicial error by excluding evidence in tv{o instances in v,rhich 
it should have been admitted and admitting evidence in one 
instance in \V hich it should h a vc been excluded. 
From the moment the answer \vas filed the issues in the 
case included the extent to "rhich plaintiff and John R. Woods 
might have had an arrangement between themselves as to 
delivery of merchandise from the defendJant's warehouse. 
This issue 'vas raised in the first instance in the second defense 
of the ansv{er ( R. 1 S ) ; and ~· i th reference to it the pre rtr ial 
order stated as follows: 
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HThe defendant clai1ns that the circumstances under 
vlhich the delivery was made constituted a contract 
implied In fact, and generally lies in the exchange of 
cor respond c n c e bet\V een plain tiff and defendant and in 
th~ practices of pJaintiff and defendant in reJation to 
deliveries and payments under the warehouse receipts. 
Part of the practice \~.ras that John R. Woods and H. A. 
Robbins, as an agent \\rith power to act for the plaintiff 
in connection v.rith the ':varehouse receipts, entered into 
an agreement) ()f agreements under "'fh·hich WaJker 
Bank and Trust Company did carry John R. Woods 
on the basis of his checks) and would ho 1 d the checks 
after delivery of the merchandise until s uc:h time as 
;vr r. \X/ ood s was able to obtain other financing under 
a ~Roo ring arrangement.' '~ 
The question is also raised~ inferentially,. in the de£ end ant· s 
second contention ( R. 2 0) . 
During redirect exam1nation of Robbins the follo~~ing 
occurred (R. 127 et seq.): 
qQ As a 1natter of fact~ Mr. Robbins, a good deal 
of this time that Mr. Woods was financing through 
your bank and using warehouse receipts, he was running 
overdrafts in his account, was he not? 
''A Some of the time. 
~·Q But you were paying checks~ you paid a large 
number of checks for him~ did you not, even though 
there was no money in the bank ? 
''A We paid a number of checks off. 
''Q You knew how Mr~ Woods \vas financing these 
appliances when he sold them) didn · t you ? 
nA Not always. 
nQ \X/ ell~ you kne\V SOme Of the tin1e, didn~t you? 
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l:
4A Wellj rd been told that some of the dealers 
fl ooted these units .. 
.. Q And what is your understanding of Rooring? 
HMR+ HENDERSON: We object your honor, it is 
irnma. ter ial. 
uTHE COURT: Jt seems to me that it is beyond the 
issue of this case~ Mr. Roe! as to what he understood 
about Roo ring and how dealers were .financing. 
~~MR+ ROE: I would like to make an offer of proof 
on it, your honor. 
* * * 
nMR. ROE: I offer to prove by this l\o~itness that he 
knew that John R. Woods was flooring the merchandise 
that ~ras being held under warehouse receipts and that 
he also understood that when wholesalers floored mer~ 
chandise they delivered it ph ysica] 1 y to the property of 
the retailer~ from which point he can make additional 
financing arrangements with other .fi nancia.l institu w 
tjons. 
!tTHE COURT: The offer is refused.'' 
The Court refused this offer partly on the grounds of 
materiality and partly, it would appear from R. 129 aod fol-
lowing, on the ground that since Mr. Robbins previously had 
testified differently, further inquiring into the flooring ar-
rangement constitued an attempt upon the part of counsel to 
impeach his own witness. 
We submit that the Court li\o-·as v.rrong V~-·hichever the 
reason. 1"'he method by which Woods dealt \Vith retailtrs~ 
.and how they obtained additiona] financing to pay for the 
goods they \vere receiving from Woods---.-since obviously under 
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a "Boor1ng arrangement" there must be some lapse of time 
between J cl i very and payment --cannot he I p but be 1nater i a I 
in this case; and it is a mis-conception of the ruJ e about im-
peaching one's O\vn 'vitness to apply it to prevent a party from 
bringing: out something inconsistent with what a ,~·itness may 
ha,~e said before. As said in .i\-lt"CornJi(k on Evidence, j 38~ 
the .rule against iinpeachment of one's own \vitness does not 
·'forbid the party to bring other evidence to dispute the facts 
testified to by his v.,· i tn ess. ,, 0 r, as said in a.nother Horn book~ 
A'fcK efpey on Et.:idence (5th Ed.) p. 5 77: 
qThere is, however~ nothing in the rule which pre-
vents a party from proving his case in the ordinary 
V~t'a y, and, if one witness sV~t·ears to facts 'v hich .it is 
necessary for a party to prove otherv.rrise to s Ll p port his 
case, he may aJways do so~ It is true that the incidental 
effect of th ~~ · r s to contra diet his own \Vi t ne5s ~ but this 
is not the purpose of the proof, as long as it is ma-
terial upon issues in the case it is admissable~'' 
It is apparent from the record that defendant was trying 
to obtain a clear s t.a tern en t £rom the v~~· i tn ess as direct testimony. 
The questions asked did nn t constitute impeachment uncle r 
any accepted test. See III Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), 
§ 874 et seq.; 4 Jones on Evidence (5th Ed.) § 931. 
1'he other two rulings on evidence of which defendant 
complains occurred during examination of witness Moorehead~ 
who on direct examination testified generally as to his former 
position as defendant's storekeeper, and methods of operation 
of the warehouse. On cross·examina tion counsel for the 
plaintiff interrogated the witness at length concerning testimony 
he had given durJng a bankruptcy proceeding~ particularly 
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with reference to invoices of John R. Woods Company and 
their meaning. The cross-examination was related to the 
method of operation of the warehouse, and appeared to be 
unobj ectlonable as a basis for impeachment of the witnesS~ 
The method employed in examining the witness \vas to read 
from a. former transcript (R. 153) and ask the witness if he 
had so testified on a previous occasion, the Y·/ i tn ess usually 
saying he had. Testimony on the previous occasion related to 
invoices seemingly showing a sale (and sometimes shipment) 
of merchandise to Woods' customers. On the basis of Mr. 
Moorehead's statements that he had previously testified in 
a certain way~ plaintiff offered in evidence five in voices, Ex· 
hi bits P ·1 s through P -19 r Defendant objected to introduction 
of these exhibits on the grounds that they were immaterial, 
.adding, prior to their admission, an additional ground of 
objection that the plaintiff had not laid a proper foundation 
(R. 165-167). Defendant pointed out that there was no 
direct testimony as to the meaning of the invoices~ and it is 
clear that the Court understood the basis of the objection 
(R. 168, 169) . Defendant agreed to their admission provided 
they were introduced sol ely for the purpose of impeaching 
the witness~ Plaintiff insisted that the invoices were admissible 
both for impeachment and as direct evidence. They were 
admitted over defendanfs objection (R. 170). 
Having introduced the invoices in evidence the plaintiff 
terminated cross-examination of the witness and in redirect 
examination the defendant attempted to hring out the meaning 
of the in voices by direct testimony ( R. 170 et seq.) When the 
witness testified, finally, that merchandise \VOU i d not ncccs-
saril y have been shipped from the vlarehouse on the date 
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sho",. n on th c invoice ( R. 1 7 3) the trial judge as much a.s 
ca lied the witness a perjurer and threatened him w itb criminal 
p roscc u tion. 
Because of the attitude of the trial judge and the seeming 
in cons is tcncy between the witness~ prior statements and his 
statements in the present case, defendant sought to inquirE: 
further in to the t e ~timon y in the former proceeding by asking 
the V/ i tness questions cone er nin g his fu 11 answers at the other 
hearing. Having examined the plaintiff's copy of the transcript 
of former testimony (R. 1 7 7) defendant's counsel proceeded 
as follows: 
4 ~Q (By Mr. Roe) Mr. Moorehead, inviting your 
attention to the testimony that you gave at the-before 
the F edera 1 District Court in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing~ rm going to read you son1c additional questions 
and answers from that proceeding and I want you to 
tell me if that ~vas your testimony at that time~ . 
qA Yes. 
"THE COLRT: Now you refer to pages, 'vill you? 
~~MR. ROE: On page 28. Q (By Mr. Roe) That 
q ucs tio n cam c after discussing with you some :.erial 
nuln ber.s on invoices. 
1 
H ~You are correctj that one does not appear; it ap-
pears on this in voice which I \vill show you in a 
mornent. Nov.r \vith reference to your previous testi-
mony~ Mr~ Moorehead, can you explain to tbe Court 
why we have an invoice here showing a. delivery da.te, 
date shipped of 7-11- 56, and your testimony 'vas that 
these \\··ere shipped out of the warehouse on that date, 
where as they also show a deli very order dated i\.fa y 1. 
195 7, the identical items r 
q 'A No~ I can't The only~-
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nMR. HOLBROOK: Just a minute~ your honor, he 
has answered the question, "LNo~ I can't.~ The rest of 
the answer is specutation on his part. He says, ·No~ I 
can
1t, · and that's his answer. Then he starts to specu· 
l3:te about that proposition. tj 
Following this th c re was consider ab 1 e discuss ion d ur ln g 
which the witness ( R. 180) explained to the Court that the 
reason he couldn't nexplain to the Courf' the discrepancy 
was ··because I couldn ~ t remember specific details concerning 
tbose s peclfic instances.'· 
Counsel for defendant was finally permitted to make 
the following offer of proof (R. 181): 
,.MR. ROE: The witness ~Tould state that in addition 
to saying, 'No, I can't,t that he added: tThe only ex· 
planation'~and as .a part of the same paragraph he 
added: <:The only explanation that I might give V~t'Ould 
be that they were not taken from the v...~archouse on 
that date.' I would also offer to prove that Mr. Hol· 
brook questioned him more specificaliy on the point 
and that thereafter he testified that th i.s must be so 
because the "va rehouse peop 1 e made monthly ins pee & 
tions or possibly not monthly but periodic ins pee tion~ 
and the goods would have to have been in the ware-
house.:>' 
This offer was rejected by the Court on the ground that 
it appeared to be t'clearly speculation." As indicated above, 
this ruling came short]y· after the trial judge's statement that, 
"if he varies his testimony and doesn't satisfactorily 
explain h1s variances to the Court, the Court may be. 
lieve that he~s a perjurer. Now you can take your 
choice on that because rm not going to have testimony 
come into the Court that is contrary to his former 
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te.stimony under oath unJ ess it is satisfactorily explained 
and if it appears to the Couri there is perjury there 
is going to be a complaint issued" ( R. 17 5). 
It is subm(tted that these rulings. on the evidence by the 
tria I con rt were not only er ron eo u.s but constituted rev ersibie 
error+ 
Clearly the invoices should not have been admitted in 
cv id ence, at least not as substantive evidence of their contents. 
~'hen the Court admitted the invoices in evidence there was 
no useable evidence as to their meaning~ how they were kept, 
or what they were suppo_sed to do. Apparently proceeding to 
impeach the witness, counsel for plaintiH asked a number of 
questions about former testimony~ But when an objection ~~as 
made to introduction of the invoices on the ground that 
there 'vas no proper foundation because no evidence of the 
present tes tim on y of the w i tne.ss, counsel for plaint 1 fl decli n c( I 
to ask him any questions about his present testimony; and the 
v.ritness v..·as still on the stand. It 1s recognized in Utah and 
almost everywhere else tha. t evidence admitted £or the purpose 
of impeaching a witness does not constitute substantive evi-
dence of facts contained in a prior statement. 
In State v. Chynoweth~ 41 Utah 354~ 126 Pac. 302 ( 1912), 
this court said: 
1 ~ 1~he rule j s e I em en ta.ry that '\V hat a \\' i tnes s ~ ·w·ho 
is not a party~ states out of court is not evidence in 
chief to prove the fact as stated by him) but can only 
be shown to discredit his testimony at the triat~ w·hen 
l1 is te.s tim on y is contradicted by such outside state-
n1 en ts. The effect of proving con trad icto ry statements 
extends no further than the ques. tion of cr edl b il i t_r: it 
does not tend to establish the truth of the matter em-
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braced in the contradictory statements; it simply goes 
to the credibility of the witness~' ~J 
The rule as announced was followed in State t.··. Bu-rns. 51 
Utah 73~ 168 Pac. 955 ( 1917). 
In lt1cConuttk on EvidenceJ § 39, the rule is stated thus: 
t
4When a \vitness has changed sides and altered his 
story or forget5 or claims to forget some fact, and his 
previous statement is received for impeachment pur-
poses, \vhat effect shaH be given to the statement a5 
evidence? Under the generally accepted doctrine the 
statement is not usable as substantive evidence of the 
facts stated. The adversary if he so requests is entitled 
to an instruction to that effect, and~ more important, 
if the only evidence of some eJJential fact is Juch a 
prerioNJ Jtatement_. the party} s caJe fails.'~ (Emphasis 
added.) 
And as said in Morgan~ Basic Problems of Iit·ide~!ce 
(American Law Institute) Vol. 1, p. 70: 
nit must, of cour5e) be noted that the prior statement 
is not to be used as evidence of the truth of the matter 
asserted) if there is a limiting instruction rIO 
See~ also1 58 Am~ Jur+J Witnesses~ § 770. 
It is also reversible error, particularly in light of later 
developments in the trial, to refuse to permit the defendant 
to examine the witness Moorehead further as to what his 
testimony was at the previous hearing. The Court had as much 
as branded the witness a liar but would not let him show him-
.self not to be. Where part of a statement of a witness is 
relied upon to impeach him, it is obvious the whole statement 
should go in J patticu larl y j f there is something in the r emai nd e r 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the statement which qualifies or explains the other testimony. 
As said in Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (American Law 
Institute). Vol. 1~ p. 72: 
~I F vidence in denial or explanation of the evidence 
of bias, interest, corruption or prior self.contradiction 
i.s ev ery~r here admissib 1 e.'· 
And in III Wigmore on Evidence ( 3rd Ed.) ~ 1044~ the 
following: · 
't]n accordance with the Logical principle of Rele-
vancy ( ant"c~ s 34), the impeached witness may always 
endeavor to explain away the effect of the supposed 
inconsisten(:y by relating v..•hatever circumstances would 
naturally ren1ove it. The contradictory statement in~ 
d.icates on its face that the witness has been of two 
minds on the subject, and therefore that there has been 
some defect of intelligence, honesty, or impartiality 
on his part; and it is concci vab l e that the in consistency 
of the statements themselves may turn out to be super-
ficial only~ or that the error may have been based not 
on dishonesty or poor memory but upon a temporary 
misunderstanding. T·o this end it is both logical and 
just that the explanatory circumstances~ if any~ should 
be recetved.' ~ 
The right to explain prior statements was recognized 
by this cour~ in Hoggan -z-·. C aboon, ·' 1 Utah 1 72~ 87 Pac. 164 
( 1906): see atso 4 Jones on Evidence (5th Ed.)., §§ 961, 962. 
Moo rchcad was not permitted to e:\:plain, and it is obvious 
£rom the trial judge t s remarks during the argument of the 
case that this made a difference to him as the trier of tbe fact.:l. 
The judge believed the invoices meant what plaintiff said tbey 
meant~ and he disbelieved Moorehead. That the judge~s erro· 
neous admission and exclusion of evidence had a substantial 
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effect upon his view of the facts is apparent from the following 
comments made during the argument: 
UTHE COURT: Well, I'm going to let Mr. Roe talk 
· about this Exhibit 2 0 [a summary of the invoices J 
because the Court is going to take that as meaning 
just what it says, that this merchandise \\ .. as out of 
the warehouse months in advance of the time they 
even made up their delivery orders.'" (R. 242) 
* * * 
nTHE COURT; Well~ do you \vant the Court to 
disregard invoices ? '' (R. 244) 
* * * 
''THE COURT: I will say this:r that under the rule 
that binds the Court with re.s pect to the preponderance 
of the evidence~ the more convincing evidence seems 
to be that merchandise 'vas de iivered months ahead of 
the time that delivery orders were made up as ap-
plicable to that evidence .. , (R. 2 59) 
* * * 
nTHE COURT: Well, it sounds like fraud. You 
people made these up. You said here~ a 'Washerl auto-
matic, Model 232K. v.re are shipping out today~' and 
the facts were, according to M r ~ Henderson~ that that 
.same washer was shipped out four 1nonths ago and 
was sold a half a dozen times in the meantime.'~ (R. 
262) . 
* * * 
~<:THE COURT: Well, when you rely upon the 
written order, then I have to take into --consideration 
this evidence with respect to the time of deli very o £ 
the goods. Now~ I have indicated to you how I feel 
about it and I have indicated to you that I am of the 
viev.-~ 'that with respect to the time of delivery, the evi-
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dence is more convincing to the Court that the mer~ 
c l1 an dise \Vas delivered from t h c warehouse 1non ths, 
1n advance of the time that the delivery orders ~vere 
mad~ up.~' (R. 271) 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the judge believed 
the invoices and didn~t believe Moorehead. It is also apparent 
that this disbelief in the credibility of the v.ritness and the 
credence given to the invoices) unsupported by any direct 
evidence;- led the judge to view the transaction entirely 
d i fi er en tl y than it was vi eVi-T ed by all of the principals to it. 
Inasmuch as the invoices were the only evidence that the 
merchandise was shipped ·~months in advance, T, their admission 
in evidence and the Court's refusal to permit .rehabilitation 
o £ !¥1( )0 rehea d, constituted reversible error. 
III 
1 K LIGHT OF ALL THE EVIDENCE, THE COURTtS 
FINDINGS OF fACT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS~ 
AND ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LA \X' AND JUDG.1\fFJ\'T 
CONTRAR'Y TO THE EVIDENCE AND AGAINST LAW+ 
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that the trial court, in all action tried upon the facts \vi thou t a 
jury~ shall ~-=find the facts s peci ally and state separate 1 y its 
conclusions of la \V." Properly applied) thjs rule would protect 
parties in cases tried to the Court from tb e well-k n O\V n practice 
o £ deciding a case because of a particular £act and, to gain 
approbation) making it appear that all facts \V ere ad verse to 
the loser; it waul d tend to permit a reviewing court to deter· 
mine (as it can in a jury case) whether a mistaken vie\v of 
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the la'v materially affected the judgment. If the findings of 
fact are sufficient in this case, our rule serves no useful purpose) 
for it is impossibJe to determine \Vhether the judge decided 
as he did because of misapplication of the Warehouse Receipts 
Act or because he chose to disbelieve the only testimony he 
had before him. 
In its findings the Court concluded that deliveries by 
defendant \vere ¥-~ithout lawful excuse and that defendant is 
liabJe to plaintiff for conversion. But to leave no doubt about 
the correctness of the decision~ the Court also found 
"all is0ues of fact in fa \'C)r of plaintiff and against 
defendant) including all issues raised in the affirmative 
defenses to the complaint and in the pre- trial order] and 
~vithout limitation of the foregoing) the Court .spcci-
ficaJly finds: that plaintiff made no representations to 
defendant, either express or implied by course of con~ 
duct, or other\\o"i.se, upon \\·hich defendant relied and 
\vhich could form the basis 1n fact or in law of any 
estoppel or contract implied in fact; * * * ~~ 
The findings of fact are unintelJigible and self-defeating. 
To fail to find a con tract bet~~een plain tiff and def en dan t 
shows a misconception of the source of defendant's dutf. 
The Court had to find some contract, somewhere. As said 
by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Arizona Storage and Dist. 
Co. v. Rynning, 37 Ariz+ 232, 293 Pac. 16, 19 ( 1930): 
~tThe reJation of warehouseman and depositor is 
contractual in nature. Their duties and obJigations are 
reciprocaJ and depend upon their agreement, and, gen-
erally speaking) the parties are at J 1berty to insert in 
their contract any terms and conditions not forbidden 
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by Ia ~· or c~n t.ca ry to public pol icy. In effect, the U ni-
form Warehouse Receipts Act so provides.~' 
See, also~ 56 Am. Jur., Warehouses, ~ 21~ and 6 Am. Jur.~ 
Bailments, § 172. 
With some minor changes the Uniform Warehouse Re-
ceipts Act has been adopted in Utah, appearing as Title 72) 
{J tah Code Annotated 195 3. The act places sotn e duties upon 
a warehouseman, and J •mits the extent to which he may change 
his duties by con tract, but except as 1 imi ted by the act a ware-
ho usetnan may contract like anybody else. Some of the re tevant 
provisions are summarized below. 
first, the act gives permission to warehouseman to issue 
warehouse receipts (72~1-1 Utah Code Annotated 195)), and 
prescribes that they must embody certain te rrn s. For failure 
to include these terms in a negotiable receipt a warehouseman 
'"'shall be liable to any person injured thereby for all damages 
caused by their omission. The act does not fix a penalty for 
failure to include the terms in a non-negotiable receipt ( 72-1-2 
V~C.A. 1953). 
The right to inc I ude other provisions in a receipt is recog-
n if.ed by 72-1-3 U ,(_A. 195 3, which provides that the ware-
houseman may insert any terms and conditions provided they 
are not contrary to the provisions of the act and do not impair 
his obLigation to exercise due c~re in the safekeeping of the 
goods. A non-negotiable receipt, the kind involved in this 
action~ is defined by 72·1-4 U.C.A. 1953. 
Three sections relate direct 1 y to the obligation of a ware-
houseman to deliver stored goods. In so far as pertinent to 
tbis action they provide: 
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.. 
''72-1-8. A warehouseman~ in tht absence of some 
lawful excuse provided for by this title, is bound ro 
deliver the goods upon a demand made either by the 
holder of a receipt for the goods or by the depositor~ 
if such demand is accompanied with: 
.. ( 1) An offer to satisfy the warehouseman's lien~ 
* * * 
·~rn case the ~·arehouseman refuses or fails to de-
liver the goods in compliance \\·i th such a demand by 
the holder or depositor~ the burden shall be upon the 
\varehouseman to establish the existence of a lawful 
excuse for such refusal+'~ 
'·72-1-9. A warehouseman is justified in delivering 
the goods, subject to the provisions of the three fo I to\v-
1ng sections to one who .is: 
n ( 1) The person lawfully entitled to the possession 
of the goods, or his a gent; 
' .. ( 2) A person \v ho is either himself entitled to 
de livery by the terms 0 f a non r ne gotia b 1 e receipt issued 
for the goods~ or who has written authority from tht: 
per son so entitled either endorsed upon the receipt or 
written upon another paper; * * * '' 
t~72-1-10. \Vhere a warehouseman delivers the good~ 
to one who is not in fact lawfully entitled to the pos· 
sion of them, the warehouseman shall he liable as for 
the conversion to all having a right of property or 
possession in the good.s, if he delivers the goods other~ 
wise than is authorized by su bdi visions ( 2) and ( 3) 
of the preceding sectioo.s; and~ though he delivers the 
goods as authorized by said subdivisions, he shall be 
so liableJ if prior to such delivery he either: 
· ~ ( 1) Has been requested~ by nr on behalf of the 
person I a \V f u 1 J y entitled to a right of pro petty or posw 
session in the goods, not to make such delivery; or, 
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1 ·~ (2) Has had information that the delivery about 
to be n1ade was to one not lawfully entitled to the 
posses5ion of the goodsr'~ 
The act nov..•here prescribes a means of detcnn.ning the 
identity of H the person J av.:full y entitled to the possession of 
the goods~ or his agent,,, leaving this to the common law. 
Neither does the act prescribe any formalities necessary to 
make a person Hla~vfuUy cntitled.n If the person to whot11 
goods 'vcrc delivered ~vas in fact lawfuiJy entitJed to them 
the warehouseman has sati s.fi.ed his obligation. The reference 
in 7 2 ·1-9 ( 2) to \V r i tten .authority does n, t increase but decreases 
the warehouseman's burden) for he may be safe in delivering 
pursuant to a v.rritten order whether or not the person to 
\vhom he delivers is lawfully entitled to the goods. A person 
rna y be · · 1 a \V fully entitled'' because of a con tract betw-een 
~·arehouseman and deposttor; or one between depositor and 
third per son; or bee a use of superior title. 
One of the cases considering the right of a warehouseman 
to rely upon a contract with the depositor-not contained in 
the warehouse receipt itself-is il1oe v. American Ice and Cold 
Slofage Co~npanyJ 30 \X' ash. 2d 51J 190 P.2d 755 ( 1948) ~ 
This \vas an action against the warehouseman for the market 
value of stored .fish. The trial court gave judgment for the 
\V arehouseman and the plain ttff appealed. The judgment was 
af1irmed by the Supreme Court of \X1ashington on the basis of 
a contract arising out of oral communications and conduct. 
The plain tiff contended that admission of the evidence wa~ 
improper because in contravention of the parol evidence rule) 
but the Supreme Court of Washington held that the pato 1 
evidence rule did not apply. (It also held that Vl~hcre the pos~ 
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sesston of the bailee had not been exclusive of that of the 
batlor the burden of proof to sho"· the lack of negligence or 
lawful excuse did not fall upon the bailee.) 
George v. Bekins Van & Storage Company. 33 CaL 2d 
834, 205 P.2d 1037 ( 1949) ~ involved the nature of the contract 
between the Storer and the warehouseman. In speaking of such 
contract the Supreme Court of California said: 
~~when ,goods are delivered to a warehouseman for 
storage and no warehouse rec:::eipt is issued at time of 
delivery~ an implied contract of storage arises con-
taining those terms required by lav..'. If this contract 
is to be superseded by the contract contained in the 
subseguently issued 'varehouse receipt, it is necessary 
that the bailor agree to the written contract as pro-
posed by the bailee. Ordinarily such assent may be 
found in the acceptance and retention of the \vare-
house receipt by the bailor. * * * By issuing its "'are~ 
house receipt de£ en dan t proposed the terms to plain tiff 
upon \Y hich it Vrt' ou 1 d continue to store the goods. 
Plaintiff accepted this offer~ and defend.anfs continued 
perf or mane e o £ the contract as bailee vl as adequate 
consideration to support the limitation clause:~ 
The intermediate Court in Gear g e "l-'. .8e kin s Van & 
Storage Company, 196 P.2d 637 (Cal. App., 1948), in uphold-
ing admission of evidence or the contents of telegrams between 
warehouseman and starer, had said: 
~·This evidence, tnoreover, was expressly not offered 
for the purpose of varying the terms of the written 
warehouse receipt, but w·ent to the issue of Vit·hether 
the receipt \\'as the only and entire con tract between 
the partie.s +' • 
We think it is clear from the case.s and the statute that a 
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warehouseman can always shows the terms of his contract with 
the s to rer as justification for de 1 ive ring to a tn ird person. In 
the present case the warehouse receipts, Exhibit P-2~ do not 
purport to be ·!integra ted agreements. t ~ There is, in fact~ an 
express reference in them to another agreement with the 
·~va rehouseman+ 
Another line of cases r e 1 evant to the d cc isio n in this case 
deals with delivery by a warehouseman to persons ·"lawfully· 
entitled,. other\vise than under the warehouseman's contract 
Vt~"ith the storer. 
Wood f. Crocker First J\Tational Bank et air, 107 Cal. 
App. 685, 291 Pac. 221 ( 1930) ~ arose out of plaintiffs de· 
posit of a valuable tru.nk with Crocker~ which mailed a receipt 
to plain tiff. The trunk was deposited in p La {n tiff~ s name, and 
she gave no delivery instructions. On N ovem be r 9~ 19 2 5 ~ 
defendant delivered the trunk to the holder of a power of 
attorney~ but v{ithout know 1 edge of the power~ The depositor 
contended that the bank was not justified in delivering because 
its officers had no knowledge of the po'"-·er of attorney; further~ 
that the Warehouse Receipts Act restricts the general power 
of attorney and therefore the delivery was unauthorized. After 
quoting Mechem on Agency)' § 744~ to the effect that if a 
party can prove actual au tho ri ty it is not necessary that he 
should have known of it or relied upon it at the time of 
dealing v.,rith the agentj the Court had the following to say 
'vith reference to the W arehc::>use Receipts Act: 
I 
4 Th e further contention of the appellant is to the 
etf ec t that this case is con tro 11 ed by the Warehouse 
Receipts Act * * * . The claim made is that the receipt 
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issued for the trunk heing non·negotiable~ under sec-
tions 8., 9 a11d 10 of said act"' the bank- was negli.~cnt 
jn delivering the trunk to Bald\vin Wood. Section 8 
deals with the rights of the holder of a receipt; section 
9 defines \\'hen a \Vatehousema.n is justified in deliver-
ing goods; section 10 deals with the liahility of a 
warehouseman for the wrongful delivery of good~. 
Without discussing the authorities cited, we are satis-
fied that, if said act a pplles in cases of this class~ 
section 9 of the act is contrary to the appeiJanfs claim. 
So far as material, said section reads: 'A warehouse-
man is justified in delivering the goods subject to the 
provisions of the three follo\ving sections~ to one \vho 
is- (a) The per son lawfully en tit 1 ed to the possession 
of the goods~ or his agent, (b) A person who is either 
himself entitled to delivery by the terms of a non-
negotiable receipt issued for the goods~ or who has 
written authority from the person so entitled either 
endorsed upon the receipt or written upon another 
paper.' As said by counsel for defendant in his brief: 
'It is obvious that Mrs~ Wood v{as a person lav..;fully 
entitled to the goods. It is obvious that Baldwin Wood 
was her agent. It follows that the bank v.ras justified 
in dellvering the trunk to Baldwin Wood~ the agent 
for Mrs. Wood. The statement of the proposition 
proves itself.~ Nowhere do we find anything in the 
said Warehouse Receipts Act that negatives this con-
clusion.'1 
In Trar-ers v. Burdge et at., 101 K. J~ 237~ 127 AtL 191 
{ 1925), the defendant had received goods in storage from 
plaintiff and given a non~negotiable 'varehouse receipt. There-
after, the defendant delivered the greater part of the. goods 
to Brookland Furniture Company by virtue of two chattei 
mortgages made by plaintiff. It v/as admitted during trial that' 
the goods delivered were covered by the mortgages and that 
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payments vlcre in default at time of deJivery. The mortgages 
contained the usual provision that in event of default of the 
stipulated pa ym en t s the company should have the right to 
retake and sell the goods~ but no formal process was sued 
out by Brookland furniture Company. The Court of Errors 
and Appeals affirmed the holding that the warehouseman \vas 
not liable, citing the Warehouse Receipts Act as au tho rit y 
for the 'va.rehouse1nan~s ju.stification in delivering to the person 
en tit 1 ed to the possession of the goods, or his ageq.t. 
In Bunnell v. Ward et ai.J 241 Micb~ 404, 217 N.W. 68 
( 1 9 2 8) , a ne gotiab] e ~rarehouse receipt had been issued to 
a partnership by a. \varehouse company. Thereafter, although 
the receipt was not surrendered, the warehouseman delivered 
goods to one of the partners~ The Michigan Supreme Cou~t 
ruled that a partner was lawfully entitled to delivery of 
par tn ers.hi p goods~ therefore the deli very w a:s justified under 
tbe act. 
Farmets' Union Warehouse Compan;: z ... Barnett et al., 
214 Ala. 202, 107 So. 46 ( 1926) ~ involved a situation in which 
the plaintiffs had deposited cotton with defendant for which 
clef endant issued n e gotia bl e receipts. In upholding the right 
of the defendant to deliver to a holder of a paramount title 
the Court said: 
"CJ.earJy no change as to the former ru1€ could be 
inferred fro1n such language, but rather a recognition 
th€rcof. The argument of counsel) rcduc€d to its tast 
analysis, .scc1ns to be tl1at the ~varehouseman is liable 
in any and every case Vi here de I ivery is made without 
a production of the recti pt ~ regard J c ss o £ whether the 
r ccei pt i5 ne go tiab 1 e, or, if so~ whether or not it has 
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in fact been negotiated. But the statute does not so 
provjdel and if so intendedj it would have been a simple 
matter to have been so expressed; * * * 
~~Our attention has not been directed to any authority 
cons truing a similar statute to the contrary to this ho 1 d ~ 
ing, and we do not think the legislative intent was to 
work a change in the rule in a case as here presented. 
Indeed~ the lawmaking body deemed it necessary t(~ 
s pecifi call y p rov ide for 1 iab ili ty o £ the ·warehouseman 
for delivery of the goods \vithout taking up the receipt 
therefore, when such receipt had been negotiated to the 
purchaser in good faith.~' 
We submit that if the trial court had correct t y v ie"':ed the 
law it would have had to find that defendant de11vered to a 
person nlawfuJJy entitled" to possession. The evidence is all 
one way. We are a~rare that a trial court's findings, particularly 
in a law case, more often than not are held to be unassailabJc. 
But the invincibility of findings is usually confined to cases 
in \v hich there is a conflict in the evidence and ··substantia I'' 
evidence to support them. 
An appellate court is not bound by the conclusions of a 
trial court based upon undisputed facts. See King ~·. Buckeye 
Cotton Oil Company1 155 Tenn. 49lt 296 Sr Wr 3~ 53 A+L.R. 
1086 ( 1927); Los Angeles lnveJitrtent Company v. Home SaP-
ings Bankj 180 CaL 601, 182 Pac 293~ 5 A.L.R~ 1193 ( 1919); 
Klatt v~ Akers1 232 Iowa 1312] 5 h~.w~ 2d 60S~ 146 A.L.R. 
808~ and Picerne v. Redd, 72 R. L 4, 47 A.2d 906, 166 A~L.R. 
397 ~ Under our constitutional provision (Article VIII) Section 
9) this Court has, of course, been required to give great weight 
to the findings of the trial court in a law case. But even under 
this provision the Court has usually [ n die a ted that it will accept 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the findings of the tria] court if the .. evidence is conflicting,' .. 
or if there is nsubstantial" evidence to support it. See Pixton 
t-'. Dlinn~ 120 ljtah 658~ 238 P.2d 408 ( 1951); and Idaho State 
Bank l-'. Hoope-r Sugar Cornpany, 74 l:tah 24~ 276 Par. 659 
( 1929). 
There ":ere certain facts in this case that the trial court 
had to find. It had to ftnd a con tract between the plain tiff and 
the defendant-and it should have found V~-·hat the terms of 
that contract \V ere. In finding the terms the Court caul d not 
" reasonably .lJ;;nore the correspondence betw-een pl.a1ntiff and 
defendant in October and Nove~nber 1956 (Appendixes A, 
B and C). Although the trial court indicated that it did not 
intend to folJow the rule "'that silence g1ves consent, .. , it should 
have. ln the recent case of V-1 Oil Cornpany v. Anchor Petro-
l ~u;n Company, 8 Utah 2d 349, 334 P .2d 760 ( 1959), this 
Court approved the view that one party may not permit another 
to believe that the contract has. certain terms and tb en later 
refuse to be bound by tho5e te rm.s. As said in that case l ~thad 
defendant desired to make it clear that tbe conditional accept~ 
a nee by p Jain tiff of defend an f s off c r was unacceptable it 
v.ro u 1 d have been a simp J e m a ttcr to have replied to plain tiff's 
letter of Septemer 6th rejecting the same." It \vould have bet? 
a simple matter for the plain tiff in this case to ha. ve rep lied 
rejecting the defendant's construction of ~-=payment.~' Plaintiff 
did not rep 1 y, and whether it did or not is of little consequence 
since the in te rp ret a tion adopted by the defendant \vas accep-
able to plaintiff and there was, in fact, a "tmeeting of the 
minds." As said in 3 Corbin on ContfaCJJJ Section 538. "'"if the 
defendant admits that he gave the same meaning to the words· 
as did the p 1 ai n tiff) he should not escape liability by convincing 
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the Court that no reasonable man in his place \vould have given 
the v.-·ords that meaning and that no reasonable rna n in the 
other party 1s place would have expected him to do so.'~ It is 
clear that as of the date of receipt of the November 12 letter 
by plain tiff there v.,· as a con tract bet \\:een plain tiff and defendant 
under \vhich defendant was to deliver merchand~se to Woods 
upon receipt of Woods~ check by the storekeeper. 'This fact 
•s borne out not only by the exchange of cor respondence but 
by the testimony of Holtt Woodsj 1foorehead, and Robbins. 
There wasn~t any other evidence on this point. Was the trial 
judge free to dis believe ? 
Following the exchange of correspondence~ for a period 
of approximately six tnonths the parties operated in accordance 
with such an understanding, much as they had done before 
that time. There \vas no obligation on the part of the defendant 
to receive a signed order from plaintiff prior to delivery of 
any goods; no obligation to insure that the check would be 
paid; no guaranty that there \vere funds \Yith which to pay it. 
The t es timon y of both l\.1 oo r ehead and \X/ ood s ~·as that 
a signed check was left with ~'oods at all times and that the 
storekeeper had authority to fill in the blanks on the check 
and deliver to the bank. That the check \vas not cotnp 1 ete, 
and that the star ek eeper for bookkeeping simplicity might have 
found it convenient, as he testified, to a.ccumuiate a number 
of items be£ ore preparing a deli very order and sen ding it to 
the bank, did not prevent the action of the storekeeper in 
obtaining a check before delivery from amounting to substa_n-
tial performance of defendant's obligations under its contract 
with plaintiff. The negotiable instruments law makes it clear 
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that the taking of in com pI eted instruments by the storekeeper 
Y./ as compliance under defend an f .s contract with the bank. It 
ts provided in 44-1-15 L~ .C.A. 19 53 as follows: 
4 ~\X' here an instrument is o,vanting in any material 
part icu I a r the person in po sses.s ion thereof has p-rim a 
fa c.- ~~c.- authority to complete it by filling up the blanks 
therein. And a signature on a blank paper delivered by 
the person making the signature in order that the 
paper rnay be converted into a negotiable instrument 
operates as prim a facie a utbority to fill it up as suth 
for any amount. * * * " · 
And 44·1·13 U.C.A~ 1953 provides that: 
''An instrument is not invalid for the reason only 
that it is antedated or postdated; provided~ that this 
is not done for an illegal or fraudulent purpose. The 
person to whom an instrument so dated is delivered 
acquires the title thereto as of the date of delivery~t• 
The evidence 1~ thus clear~ based upon the testimony of 
the four principals ~ nJ the documents, that the bank received 
substantially \\-'hat it bargained foL The \\··arehousetnan de~ 
livered the goods as Woods n ccJed them in his business and 
took in exchange Woods' checks. lt is no answer to say that 
one or more checks may have been postdated:t or not completeJ~ 
or delivered in blank~ It rs no answer to say that the storekeeper 
rna y have held the checks for some time before d eiivering 
thcrn to the bank. These things bear upon ~~hether the warer 
ho usern an breached other o bl iga tions of its con tract with 
plaintiff-but it would be \V riting a new and different con tract 
to hold that authority to deliver was conditional upon them. 
Perhaps defendant breached a contractual duty v:hen it did 
not trans1nit delivery orders and checks on a daily basis; 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
perhaps it 'vas a breach to take post-dated checks; but to find 
a breach does not solve the problem. This contract contained 
a number of promises, a grant of authority~ and a number of 
conditions. The authority granted was to deliver property to 
Woods. Admittedly the authority was conditional. But~ con-
sidering the undisputed evidence, what 'Nas the .substance of 
the condition? The evidence compels a tinding that plaintiff 
\\'anted a Woods check) but that it didn't care about much 
else-\vhether it \vas given immediately before or after delivery~ 
or whether Woods had money in the bank. Appendix D j5 
a s un1 mary of the t r ansae tions as based upon the dates of 
the delivery orders~ the dates they were received in Los Angeles~ 
the period of time during \Vhich the bank held \\1 ood.s' checks 
and the instances in which overdraft.s in the .account \vere 
honored. Plaintiffs conduct during the period belies its con-
tentions now. Appendix D alone negatives any conclusion 
that defendant materially breached its contract~ or materially 
breached the condition upon which de] ivcry was author1 zed. 
Nat every breach of contract i.s a breach of condition. 
Admittedly defendant may be held liable to plaintiff fo1 
damages resulting £rom any breach. But if it Vtt' ere suing for 
breach o£ con tract plain tiff would have to s.hov..· that .it suffer cd 
a loss because of the breach; it would have to come forward 
and explain its h andJ 1ng of the John R. W ood.s account and 
tell w by, during the period in v.r hich it \vas J ish on o ring 
checks drawn in pa}'ment for stored goods, it ~Tas paying itself 
on other checks made by John R. Woods in an amount in excess 
of $4700.00 (Exhibit D-23), and payil"lg others in amounts in 
excess of $1500.00 (Exhibit D-22). 
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If the problem is viewed as one involving the extent of 
defendant's au tho rit y to deliver, de£ en dan t was, · _under the 
circumstances, authorized[() deliver. See Restatement of Agencj'~ 
§~ 33, 34. If viewed simply as a contractual problem, there 
V./as no material breach of defendanf s duty to plaintiff. See 
ReJtt:ttement of ContractJ, §~ 263t 274~ 275. 
Regardless of plaintiffs agreement with defendant, Woods 
Vias a person ~ 'la \V fully en tit led, or his agent·:> under his agree~ 
men t v..r ith the bank. Woods himself testified that Robbins. 
agreed that he could take the goods out and use them in his 
business as a mere handise jobber~ whether or not he cou1d 
pay for thetn immediately. He was to have the goods by asking 
for them. Woods, Robins and Moorehead aJl bear this out. 
Moreover, it is apparent that the plaintiff and Woods worked 
the proposition together and that plain tiff retained some joint 
control of the "':arehouse. \Vben the plaintiff discovered short-
a ge.s in the \varehous e Robbins pointed them out to Woods, 
not to the storekeeper nor to de£ endant' s Los Angeles off ice .. 
AlJ this, and the conduct inferrable from Appendix D, show 
that John R. Woods was lawfully entitled from the standpoint 
of an agreement betv..Teen him and the plaintiff, or \vas the 
plaintiffs agent~ 
In any event, p 1 a in tiff v.r~ as estopped from claiming that 
the deliveries to Woods \ve r e- u n la 'v ful. The tria i court imputed 
kno\vledge of Woods' books and accounts to the defendant 
storekeeper and conc]uded that the defendant ·\vas charged. 
\vith that kno\vledgc. ErgoJ defendant cannot sho'v ''"good 
faith" reliance. We submit that all of the elements of an 
estop pel were present. There \vas some kind of an arrange-
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ment between Woods and plaintiff; defendant's storekeeper 
knew about it; defend ant~ s storekeeper suspected that Woods 
was not in good financial condition; notwithstanding th1s sus-
picion and notwithstanding the drawing of checks more or 
less indiscriminately, all checks drawn by the s to rekee per or 
by Woods in connection ~vith the removal of goods from the 
defendant~s \varehouse were in fact honored by plaintiff ur1bl 
the first \veek in May~ 1957; plaintiff continued to let the 
store keeper (defend an f s eyes and ear 5 on the scene) believe 
that everything was all right, dealing directly with Woods 
upon discovery of shortages. It \vou1d be improper for the 
Court to isolate the know ledge of one of de fendanf s agents 
for the purposes of determining the extent to \V hich de fen dan t, 
a corporation~ relied upon the conduct of plaintiff. It is un-
disputed that the corporation tried to protect itself through 
reports and periodic inspections and inventories of the 'vare-
house, but plaintiff made the de fen dan f s record keeping con-
siderably more difficult and less rewarding through the honor~ 
ing of no-fund checks~ the holding of checks and delivery 
orders, and the giving of notices to John R. Woods when dis~ 
crepanc1es were found in the vi:arehouse. "The defendant as 
a whole~ as a corporation~ no doubt would have taken additiona I 
steps to protect itself had it not been led by pJainti.ff to beJieve 
that the method .ln ~~hich the \Varehouse was being operated 
\vas sa tis factory. P Jain tiff as much as to 1 d the storekeeper that 
·it would dea 1 directly with Woods w .lth respect to discrepancies 
-discovered in the warehouse. (See LarJen v. Knightj 120 litah 
261 ~ 233 P.2d 365~ 372 ( 1951); and cf Heaton et al. t·. i\1a-r-
tlnez~ 3 (;tah 2d 259, 282 P ~2d 833, 835 ( 1955). 
The fact recital is based upon the testimony of the four 
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principals and the documents in evidence. But the Court "''as 
thro,vn on the v.rrong scent and follo'h·ed five invoices avlay 
from the hunt. The invoices \\.'ere accepted by the Court as 
sho~ring JeJ iveries out of the warehouse ··months in advance'' 
of issuance of delivery orders for the same merchandise by 
Moorehead as s b) r ekee per. As prev i( lusl y pointed out, admis-
sion of the invoices ~~as improper since their lncaning., purport 
and val1dity haJ not been established. Hut assuming their 
admis.sion v..Tas proper~ they stilJ do not prove what the trial 
COLlrt took them to prove. The testimony reJating to them \vas 
that the date shown as "shipmenf~ date on the invoices \vas 
not necessarily the date of shipment from the warehouse, and 
that \vhere no shipment date 'vas shown, the invoice date would 
not be th c .shipment date. ( ~loo rehead tes ti:fi ed that if he had 
.said in a p rev iou.s hearing that the invoice date represented 
the shiptnent date he would have been wrong.) But by com~ 
pa r1 n g the in voices w i tl1 eacb other, and with the warehouse 
rcc-c i pts~ it 1 s a p parcn t that t be invoices prove nothing. Appendix 
E is a table prepared by comparison of serial numbers of 
various items found on invoices with those found on other 
invoices~ and with the ~Tarehouse receipts. If Invoice A w·as 
correct~ B \Vas incorrect; and if either ··v..t as correct~ some of 
th c goods were shipped out before they \Vt re received in the 
\\.'arehouse in the fir.st place. l\.1oreover, the invoices are un· 
believable when compared \vtth other evidence as to inspections 
and the method of handling delivery orders and reports. 
Inspection reports sh OVv~ that the goods were all ac<:oun ted for 
as late as M a reb 2 7 ~ 19 57 (plaintiffs Exhibit P- 1 0) . 1'he 
report of January 17, 1957, and the testimony of Holt and 
Robbins as to 1nspections deprive the invoices of all \\··eight. 
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IV 
THE COURT ERRED l~ DENYIT'\'G THE DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFtS COST HILL 
AKD IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF'S COSTS. 
Rule 54 (d) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides as follows: 
ttA party \vho claims his costs rnust w·irhin five days 
after the cnt ry of judgment serve upon the advcr~e 
party against 'vhom costs are claimed and file \\'ith the 
Court a verified memorandum of the items of his cost 
and necessary disbursements in ·the action or proceed-
ing .stating that to affiant's kno~vlcdge the items are 
correct, at1d that the disbursements have heen neces-
sarily incurred in the action or proceeding~ A party 
dissatisfied "i;Vith the costs claimed, may~ \\'ithin five 
days after service of the memorandum of costs file a 
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the Court 
in which the judgment was rendered.~' 
The record .shO"\\'S that the judgment was entered on ApriJ 
30~ 1959 (R. 280), and that on 1\1ay 5~ 1959~ an unverified 
~~Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements" was filed br 
plaintiff (R. 284). On May 6, 1959, the defendant moved for 
an order striking the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements 
on the ground that it had not been verified. Thereafter~ on 
May 11~ 1959, after the period within which the original 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements might have been 
filed under the rule, plaintiff moved. for leave to file a supple-
mental memorandum on the ground that the one theretofore 
filed contained errors arising from oversight or omission. On 
June 5, 1959, the Court entered an order denying defendanfs 
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motion to strike the cost bill but taking no action upon plaintiffs 
motion to nJc a supplemental bilL 
This Court, in Houghton v. Bartonj 49 Utah 611, 165 
Pac. 4 71 ( 1917)) stated that there must be at least a substantial 
com pli ancc with th c requirements of a former secti O!ll much 
like Rule 51 (d) ( 2) ; and the Court has been strict in con-
s t r u ingr o the; r eq uiremen ts relating to cos t5. For in sta nee~ in 
1\1elson I-'. ArrouJhead Freight Lines; 99 Utah 129~ 104 P.2d 
225 ( 1940) ~ it was held that a cost biH which did not reach 
the Clerk~ s office until the sixth day after verdict) although 
mailed on the fifth day} should ha vc been s tr ic:ken. Our rule 
is explicit in requiring the Memorandum of Costs and Dis-
bursements to be ve riE ed~ and the filing of an unverified one 
is not substantial compliance. 
v 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFEND-
AN1~·s MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
On May 11, 1959, the defendant moved for a new trial~ 
partly on the ground of ne""· ly discovered evidence which should 
not ha vc been discovered before triaL The evidence was, sub-
stantially, that Superior Heating and Appliance Company, the 
purchaser to whom most of the shipments were sho~rn to have 
been made on the John R~ Woods invoices, was a company 
controJicd by John R~ Woods~ indicating that it would ha,.-e 
been pas si ble to sh ovl shipments to this company without 
n1 a king any physical change of the goods from the warehouse. 
Although defendants recognize that this relates to a col-
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lateral matter, we believe that denial of the motion for a new 
trial in this case was an abuse of discretion bee a use of the 
fact tha. t the in voices, as a pp eared from the record, had a sub-
stan tial effect on the outcome of the case; and under defendant· s 
theory this could not have been anticipated. 
The trial court knew that its view of the facts \vas infl•J-
enced primarily by what it took the invoices to mean. When 
it had an opportunity to reconsider the invoices, and receive 
new evidence that the invoices did not mean any such thing~ 
indicating that the remainder of the evidence---coherent~ con~ 
sistent and compelling belief, without the invoices-was correctj 
the trial judge should have. granted the mo.tion. This is par-
ticularly true in light of the other grotmds for a ne\v trial 
pointed out to the trial court, i.e.~ the error in admitting the 
invoices in the first place, the refusal to perm it d ef end a 11 t 
to sho"v plaintiff~s knowledge of Woods' arrangements with 
his retail dealers, and the ref usa i to penni t d ef en dan t to 
rehabilitate the witness Moorehead~ 
CONCLUSION 
Insofar as the merits of the case go, the evidence prohibits 
recovery by plaintiff in an action for conversion. The tria.l 
judge was wrong unless defendant not only had the burden 
of proof but the judge was free to disbelieve all the persons 
who had first- hand knowledge of the transactions. The tr 1 al 
judge seemed to be influenced primarily by the invoices and 
the fact that the defendant maintained a warehouse on the 
premises of the debtor~ Woods~ and empl eyed a person there~ 
tofore and sometimes thereafter in the employ of Woods~ 
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Hut the Court failed to reali1e that this is a .fairly standard 
practice \vith reference to field warehousing arrangements such 
as this. See 1To1n Bny Stores,. Inc. r:. Douglas-Guardian Ware~ 
houJe (.'orporatir;nJ 23 7 Mo. App. 892, 179 S.W. 2d 145 
( 1.944); and Bradley t-'. St, Louis Tenninal Warehouse Cnn~­
fhoJ_l', 189 f.2d Hl8 (8 Cir., 1951). 
De fen dan t, as a service to plain tiff and Woods, rna in tained 
a \\'are house on \X' ood s ~ pr etni se.s. P la 1 n tiff knew ,~.here the 
\'--'arehouse was and that Woods \vould be there operating a.:; 
a Vtt' ho J c saJ er of goods. The proof s hov..rs, indeed, that plain bff 
p.a rti c i pa ted to a n1 u ch larger extent in Woods' activities than 
Jid defendant or any of its agents. The bank \vas in on things 
frorn the beginning. It knew· ,..vhat Woods \\-'as doing and 
ho'A-' he '"-ras operating in the warehouse. It kept a constant 
ch~ck on him; and when it found something wrong> Woods 
\\ .. a :i told about o t. Only the defendant ~ras kept in the dark. 
1~he Court had to believe the clef end ant· s evidence because 
the de fen dan t produced all of the principals to the transaction; 
there ~Tasn't really anyone eJse left to testify. There being no 
confl.ic t but plenty of corroboration in the evidence, it vlas. 
the duty of the Court to accept that evidence. It ha.d to find 
there 'vas a contract; it had to find that there was substantial 
performance by defendant; it had to find an arrangement 
between the plaintiff and Woods under \\.'hich Woods was 
authorized to pick up the goods to give the b.ank a check for 
them "v hether he had funds or not. And a.t that) the evidence 
in defendant's behalf might have been stronger than it ~·as. 
The Court refused to hear what plaintiff knew about the kind 
of arrangements Woods as a wholesale appliance dealer ~·as 
making with his retailers. 
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The Court also erred in admitting the invoices in ~vidence. 
There \vas no direct evidence as to what the invoi(es mea~t) 
only stat em en ts about prior sta tern ents elicited from lV[oo r e-
head on cross-examination) and which could not be used as 
proof of the substantive facts contained in prior statements. 
[ v en thenl admission of the invoices would ·not have been 
so unpalatable if the Court had not attributed to them a validity 
and a meaning unwarranted by their o~· n inconsistency and 
all of the other £acts of the case+ To ''believe 1 • the invoices, 
the tria 1 court must have dis be 1 ieved all of the other evidence. 
Holt testified consistently that the de£ en dan t company tnade 
regular checks of the warehouse and physically counted the 
stocks then on hand; Moorehead said they did; Woods said 
they did; Robbins said the bank~ too) checked the serial numbers 
but discovered short$.ges only once in awhile~ (In light of 
this disbelief perhaps the Court did no harm in not permitting 
rehabilitation of Moorehead since it felt free to disregard 
testimony whether a witness· s credibility 'vas sullied or not.) 
Since no allowance ~vas given to defendant for any of the 
disputed deliveries~ the trial court must also have disbelieved 
Holt~ s undisputed, corroborated testimony that on May 1 0~ 195 7) 
he found 5 or 6 units in the warehouse, made a delivery order 
for them~ obtained a check from Woods and sent the check .and 
delivery order to the bank~else how was defendant a con-
verter of those units ? 
The trial court made at J east three reversible errors in 
its mUng upon the evidence; another in placing the burden of 
proof upon the defend ant. N ot'v ithtanding these errors) the 
defendant met the burden of proof 'vith more evidence than 
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v.ra5 necessary; but the Court disregarded the evidence and 
even found all facts in favor of the plaintiff and against the 
de£ endant \X' e be I ieve it is cJ ear that the trial court either 
misunderstood the Jaw or disregarded the purport of uncon-
tradicted evidence in the case. The judgment should be reversed 
and the Court directed to enter j udgrnent for the defendant~ 
no cause of action~ 
Res pectf u 11 y submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continenta I Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1~ Utah 
Attorneyr fnr Defendant and Appellant 
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H. A. ROBBINS 
APPE:t\~DIX A 
FIRST MURRAY BRA0.rCH 
~-fur ray 7, Utah 
October 16~ 1956 
Vice P resident-Manager 
New York T c:rrn [nal Warehouse Company, Inc. 
5 20 West Seventh Street 
Los Angeles 14~ Cat if ornia 
Attentjon: Mr. Jack Holt 
Gent]emen: 
We are presently financing aga•nst your v..~arehouse receipts for 
the John R. Woods Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. These receipts 
cover appl1ances! and it is our method of operation that these units~ 
-one or more] be paid for at the tjme they are w ithdta \Vn. 
Th!s is to advise you that this is the manner in which 'V~/C will 
handle a11 tran5action s which we presently have or may have in the 
future. 
HAR:ec 
CC: John R. Woods Company 
/s/ H. A+ ROBBINS 
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APPENDIX B 
NEW YORK TERMINAL WAREHOUSE CO~ 
) 2 0 West Seventh Street 
Los Angeles 14~ California. 
November 12, 19)6 
Mr. H. A. Robbins~ Vice President 
Walker Bank & Trust Company 
1-lurray 7; Utah 
Dear Mr_ Robbins: 
I have been a way f tOffi the city most of the time for the past th (ee 
Vitceks and apologize for being so late in answering your letter: of 
October l6t h, relat ~ ve to de 1 ivery of goods from our Warehouse J\To. 
2552-2 operated for John R_ Woods Co. 
I asked M r _ Wood_~ to arrange v . :ith you the method of de 1 i very 
which you wanted to authorize of material from the warehouse under 
the warehouse receipts w hkh you are holding~ and f corn you ( let tcr 
interpret that you w i:sh to authorize deli very from the warehouse upon 
the rccc-i pt~ by our Storekeeper! of a check f rotn John R. Woods Co. 
I am at t a( h 1 n g for your inspection, and mod. i fication if you so desire, 
an out I ine of Deli very Instructions which are of ten tendered to u:s by 
ware house rccc i pt holders for the deJ i very of goods from our ware-.-
houses. 
T I hi n k you wIll fi n ( J that the i nst ructions as outlined gjve protection 
to both the ·warehouse company and the Bank and set definite limits: 
on the operation of the warehouse. W c would 1 ike very much to have 
our de 11 very instructions from you in somewhat the out lined form,. in 
tr j p 1 icate. Please nnde rstand that we can and wi 11 operate within any 
lim its that yolt set. 
If you have any questions, as to this or any other phase of the opera-
t ~on! do not hesitate to v;,rr ite to us. 
Very truly yours:. 
I nco rpo rated 
NEW YORK TERMINAL WAREHOUSE CO~ 
js/ C. J. HOLT 
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APPENDIX C 
(Bank Letterhead) 
N tv.' York Terminal Warehouse Companr ~ Inc:. 
~20 West Seventh Street 
Los Angeles 14., California 
Date ..... ·-····························· 
GentJemen: 
To secure certain loans made and to be made by the Walker Baok 
&. Trust Corn pany (he reinaf t cr sometimes ref erred to a..~ the "Storerro) , 
the Storer bas and will pledge to the Bank non-negotiable warehouse 
receipb evrd~nc:Eng the storage of appli;) nces. \X' e understand tha.t 
these items wilf be held in your Warehouse No. 25)2 at 52) West 
1 st Sou thJ SJ.l t Lake City t Utah. Other 1 ocat1onst ho\vever! Jnay be 
utjlj2ed as necessary. 
These Instructions are your au thor ity to deljve r to the Storer f ron 1 
such merchandise stored in the Bank's name and held for it~ account 
the fo! low[ng described goods subject to the conditions and rcstrktion~ 
oudined herein. 
l. You may dellver goods~ in aw one day .. having a total dolJar 
value of $ .. _ ..... _ .. __ . _ ... _ .. _.. based on values as shown on yon r 
v:.~arehouse receipts .andjor your rtcciving record on which the 
warehouse receipt is based. 
2. Prior to any rdease of inventor}"" made by you under the provi .. 
sions of these instruct!ons=' the John R. Woods. Company is to 
tender to you it~ check dra~:n on and payable to Walker Bank 
& Trust Company in an amount el:lual to ........ % _________ .. of 
the declared dollar Value of the mer(handise to be delivered. 
3. This check, together with your regular delivery order form 
(in duplicate) on which is to be listed the particular goods 
delivered~ together with reference to the Warehouse Ret€ i pt 
number, or n 1unbers! under which it was stored! and other 
pertj nen t descriptions are to be m:a iled via United States First 
Class Ma 11 by a representa t ivc of the New York Termina 1 
Warehouse Co.; on the same day which it i.s rccei v cd. It 1 s 
agreed that you shaH have no further liability -in connection 
with such checks or the value thereof. The depos[tj ng in the 
United States Mails as outlined above shall automatitall y re-
instate you t authority to d eJ iver to John R. W ootls Company, 
subject to the limitations set forth above. This Del1very Order 
in duplicate (one copy to be retained by us) we agree to execute 
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and return to you promptly at 52 0 West Eeventh Street, los 
A nge le s, Cal if ornia~ if com plcte and in proper order. 
4. Th [ s authority to de I i ver merchandise shall not give to the 
John R. Woods Company~ any .right) tit 1 e or i ntcrest in or to 
any of the merchandise in satd Vitarehouse stored in our name 
and for our accounl except as noted above and subject to the 
various restrict-ions and s.ti pu lations as outlined herein. 
5. You wi I l not permit any charge for aoy reason w hlch may 
be or become a lien on the mer-chandise cove red by your Ware· 
house Receipt or Receipts and held by us to remain unpaid 
longer than .}0 ~a y s af tcr the end of the month in w hrch such 
charges accrued::' unless you shall immediately notj fy us .as to 
such unpaid cha. rges in each instance. 
6. These instructions executed by us in triplicate shall become 
cffccti ... c only upon your deli very to us of a duly executed. copy 
hereof signed by one of your off icets evidencing acceptance 
of the provisions {Onta ined therein. Upon becoming effective~ 
the~c instructions shall supersede alJ previous instructions and 
shal I .remain in fuJ J force and effect unti 1 amended or cancelled 
by the bank in writing. 
Please acknowledge receipt of and agreement to these conditions by 
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...,.._,~,a·& "'-1..1.." .L..I'..n&....J.YDR1 '-'"·~~U"\.....~·-
Delivery Orde-t Check 
Number Date Amount Date Amount Date Charged 
~eiveg ig.,. L.A. 
To Account Date O:<Y. 
1001 :S-21-,6 $ 184.45 Unknown $ 184.45 '-23~,6 5~24-S6 
1002 7·17-56 2962.15 Unknown 
7-24-~6 
1003 7·17-56 548.00 3510.15 7-23-56 7-24-56 
1004 7-19-56 573.00 Unknown 573.6o 8- 6-56 8& 1·56 
1005 9-12-56 822.00 Unknown· 822.00 9~21-56 10-1 '5 -56 
1006 9-18-56 2923.63 Unknown 4520.3) 10-10- )6* 10·1 S-56 1007 9-18·56 1596.75 10·1 5-56 
1008 9-19-56 303.60 Unknown 303.60 10-11&56 10·15-56 
1009 10-16-56 527.35 LToknown 527.35 10-19·56 10·22-56 
1010 10-17-56 3372.30 Unknown 3372.30 11- 8-56 11· c;-~6 
1011 11- 7-56 1271 . ..JO Unknown 1271.40 11-1S-S6 11-19-56 
1012 11- 9-S6 2226.45 Unknown 2226.4) 11~1Srj6 11~ 19-'6 
1013 11-21-56 134.3) Unknown Not Charged 12-21-56 
.... 
101.-i 12~ S-56 1465.00 Unknown 1<'165.00 12-11-56* 12-13-56 
101j 12- 6-56 2713.80 12- 6-56 3995.8) 12-14·56 12-17-56 v. 1016 12- 6~56 1282.05 12~17-)6 \0 
1017 12- 7-56 1040.35 I· 2~5 7 10--10.35 1- R-57 1·10-57 
1018 1- 9-57 734.3) 1- 9-5 7 734.35 1-15-57 1~ 16-5 7 
1019 lr17•57 1072.10 2- S -S 7 1072.10 2- 6-)7 2-15-57 
1020 1-21-57 1389.70 2- 5 r S 7 1389.70 2~ 19-57* 2&2:5-57 
1021 2-14-)7 935.60 2-14-.57 935.60 2-19<17* 2·25-)7 
1022 2-21wS7 1635.10 2-25-57 1635.10 3-20-57* 3-21-57 
1023 3-11-57 1101.05 3·15·57 1101.05 4-16<)7 4-18-.5 7 
1024# 4 ·3-S7 1 J 6'1.80 5· 6-57 
1025 4~30·57 685.00 (i -30<5 7 685.00 5- 9-57 5-13-57 
1026 j- 1-57 822.00 5- 9~j7 822.00 
1027 5~ 2-5 7 965.00 5- 9-5 7 96S.OO 
1028 S- 3-57 1507.00 5-16-57 1507.00 
1029 5~ 7-S7 6814.30 
1030 5-10-57 628.70 . 5~10-57 628.70 
*I o d i (ates overdraft. 
# 1024 was for correcting serial numb~rs. No check accompan.i~d it. 
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APPENDIX E 
Me rc hand isc Invoites on Which ·shown Warehouse Receipt Deliv~ry Order 
Model Serial No. No. Date No. Date No. Date No. Date 
332X 83771 1852 9r28•J6 2033 11- 7-56 15r09 10r15w56 1024 4- 3-57 
232X 85296 1852 9-28-56 23-19 1-17-57 14-09 10-15-56 1020 1~21·57 
232X 85291 18)2 9·28-56 2349 1-17-57 14r09 10-15-56 1029* j. 7-57 
232X 8)289 1852 9-28-5 6 2349 1·17-57 lil~09 10-15-56 1027* 5- 2-) 7 
232X 85257 18)2 9-28-)6 20)5 llr 7•56 14-09 10-15-56 1026* 3· 1·57 0 
232X 8)287 1852 9~28-56 2349 1-17-57 14·09 10r15r)6 1025 4~3Qrj7 \t) 
ri 232X 8)282 1852 9-2R-56 2349 1~17-57 14~09 10-15-.56 1025 4-30-57 
I 232X 85258 18)2 9~28- )6 203) 11 r 7<56 14-09 10·C5~56 1026* )r 1•57 
232X .85288 lB52 9-28-56 2349 1-17-57 14·09 1 0-15· 56 1027* 5- 2-57 
232X 85259 1852 9-28-5 6 2033 ll· 7-'56 14-09 10-15-)6 1026* 5- 1-57 
232X R)295 LR52 9r28u)6 23·19 1-17-57 14-09 l0-15·56 1027* ). 2·57 
232X ~5290 1~)2 9-2R-56 2349 1-17-57 14·09 10-15-56 1022 2~21-57 
33lX 83126 1892 10-10-)G 2033 ll· 7-56 15-09 10-l)-)6 1024 4- 3<)7 
* Ident[fi~::t fin a I group of delivery orders not signed by plaintiff. 
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